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Introduction
In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan
sketches and argues for a hierarchical account of moral status.
Although the book is fairly lengthy at 304 pages of text, Kagan
is correct in calling it a sketch, since what this book provides
us with is a foray into one aspect that a comprehensive ethical
theory must include, in his view, if it is to be plausible. Even so,
the work that he does, if one accepts hierarchy, opens up many
different avenues to be further pursued in animal ethics.

Kagan’s Sketch
Before introducing Kagan’s hierarchical theory of moral status, we must attend to his distinction between moral standing
and moral status. Having moral standing means that a being
counts morally in itself, such that we can owe moral duties to
it, or morally wrong it in itself. On the other hand, moral status
involves the specifics of how much a being counts in our moral
calculations, and what requirements govern our behavior towards it.
The traditional way of construing the principle of equal consideration of interests, such that interests of the same quantity
are to be treated the same, gives us the view that Kagan takes
as prevalent in animal ethics, and which he argues against,
namely unitarianism. According to unitarianism, there is one
moral status. Similar interests should be treated similarly. Kagan’s hierarchical reinterpretation of the principle of equal consideration of interests helps us to understand his view. Properly
understood, the principle of equal consideration of interests
tells us to treat interests that are similar in terms of morally relevant features similarly. It is the case, however, that a morally
relevant consideration is to whom or what the interest belongs.
If, say, a quantitatively similar pain belongs to a person on the
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one hand, and a nonhuman animal which is not a person on
the other, then this pain is more significant in the former case.
Beings that have psychologically richer capacities, whether in
the actual world, potentially, or modally, have more important
interests.
When it comes to value theory, or the theory of the good,
differential moral status matters in a number of ways. For
example, distributive principles will be weighed more heavily towards the interests of higher beings. Nonhuman animals
still fall under distributive principles, whether egalitarian, sufficientarian, prioritarian, or desert, but their interests are less
weighty in fulfilling these principles because they have a lower
moral status. In the case of the value of well-being, a similar
quantity of well-being will be more valuable in the case of a
being with higher rather than lower status.
In the case of moderate deontology, nonhuman animals and
marginal cases have deontological rights that are based on autonomy (or agency, or whatever else may ground such rights),
but these rights are weaker because of the possession of less autonomy. The psychological capacity that grounds deontological
rights is less rich, so the rights are not as strong.
Kagan appreciates the fact that critics may worry here about
the problem of normal variation. If different psychological capacities grant a being different status, whether in our theory of
the good or concerning deontological rights, then it seems that
human beings will vary in their moral status because they have
different capacities. The critic will find this unacceptable.
Kagan has an answer here. We can construe the hierarchical
account of moral status as wed to practical realism, and thus
get a limited hierarchy. On, say, rule consequentialism (or other
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foundational ethical theories), it is too cumbersome in practice
to take into account minute differences in status. Instead, we
will need no more than half a dozen or so categories of status.
This gives us a step function, such that moral status is hierarchical in that it goes up, but the categories themselves are
uniform until we go up to the next category. In such a way, we
can avoid the idea that normal adult humans should be treated
differently because of different levels of psychological capacities. Severely disabled humans will count for less than normal
adult humans in Kagan’s view, but their modal status increases
their moral status above their psychological peers.

Kagan’s Arguments
Why accept a hierarchical account of moral status? Kagan
gives us a few arguments here. First, the unitarian strategy to
avoid the absurd consequence that there is a moral tie when
we are faced with the choice of saving a mouse or a human
from drowning seems to implicitly lead us to hierarchy. The
unitarian avoids a moral tie by saying that the life of the human
is more valuable in being longer and fuller of more valuable
goods. Saving the human avoids the greater harm. In employing this strategy, however, the unitarian will seem to be committed to a standing presumption in favor of those beings with
richer psychological capacities over those with the poorer ones.
This seems to imply hierarchy.
Second, Kagan gives an argument from distributive principles. When we combine unitarianism with any distributive
principle (and we must endorse a distributive principle), then
we run into absurd consequences. In the case of an egalitarian principle, since normal adult humans have richer lives than
those below them in capacities, we have a standing duty to redress this natural inequality by attending to the well-being of

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 25, Issue 1

115
Benjamin Elmore

nonhuman animals. Similar absurdities follow from joining the
other distributive principles with unitarianism.
Third, in the case of deontology, unitarianism would preclude a castaway from taking the life of a nonhuman animal,
whether a deer, fish, etc. in order to save his own life. In the
case of absolutism, this would be because the right to life has
no threshold. In the case of moderate deontology, this would
be because the threshold for infringing the right to life of the
nonhuman animal could not be met if its moral status is the
same as a human. One could try to go the route of restricted deontology and not include nonhuman animals among those who
have deontological rights, but Kagan rightly thinks that whatever capacity grounds deontological rights will not be wholly
absent in the case of nonhuman animals, and thus neither will
such rights be absent, albeit they will be weaker.

Kagan’s Critics
In this final section, I will briefly survey and address just a
few criticisms made against Kagan that seem natural enough
to make, and likely to have broad appeal in the animal ethics
community, but which I believe are nevertheless mistaken. My
countercriticisms will be against general theoretical considerations rather than providing a defense of Kagan’s more specific
arguments.
First, Andrius Gališanka notes that because Kagan grants
nonhuman animals moral standing, and acknowledges that the
way we treat them is morally horrendous, his approach has
liberating potential (Gališanka 2021, 370). This liberating potential, however, is said to be tempered by the hierarchical account of moral status. This is, of course, true to some degree.
If nonhuman animals have a lower status than humans, then
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there are cases in which nonhuman animals will lose out in our
calculations. An instructive example of this is Kagan’s own,
in which it is permissible to kill a nonhuman animal in order
to preserve the life of a castaway. At least in this case, Kagan
seems to get the right answer. Getting the right answer is more
important than the mere fact that nonhuman animals may lose
out, because sometimes they probably should. We will only hit
a snag when the hierarchical approach gives us the wrong answer, and this remains to be seen. Liberating potential, then, is
only relevant when that liberation is itself legitimate.
Second, Jeff Sebo has called into question Kagan’s reliance
on moral intuition in idealized, simple cases (Sebo 2021, 695).
There are a few worries that Sebo has here. First, we may tend
to underestimate the capacities of nonhuman animals. Second,
we may tend to underestimate the moral status of nonhuman
animals because a) we have a speciesist bias, and b) we may be
unwilling to make the radical changes that a proper consideration of nonhuman animals requires. Sebo thinks that Kagan’s
book may be particularly susceptible to biases that corrupt our
intuitions because he relies on a bottom-up rather than topdown methodology, i.e., on moral intuitions in individual cases
rather than moral principles.
There are a few questions to ask here. First, is Kagan himself corrupted by speciesist (or other) biases in constructing his
theory? Second, even if the first question is answered in the
negative, is it the case that those who adopt the hierarchical approach that Kagan has started may not do their due diligence to
avoid speciesism and misuse this theoretical apparatus?
In the first case, Kagan certainly seems to have taken great
care in writing his book. Kagan is a critic of the moral atroci-
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ties we commit against nonhuman animals, and takes pains to
point out that his theory does not preclude that judgment. To
point out that speciesist biases are deeply entrenched is not to
prove that Kagan cannot transcend them through responsible
critical reflection. Furthermore, Kagan could easily retort that
his critic may be caught in a sub-culture, namely the one of
animal ethics, that has had its own entrenched ideas that are
non-hierarchical. If we focus too much on our social situatedness, then we can preclude ourselves from making judgments
that we really can plausibly make.
As for the second point, this seems more serious, especially
since Kagan wants us to think hierarchically in our daily interactions with nonhuman animals. The answer to this question
will depend on who we are considering. No doubt some people
could fail to uphold their epistemic duty to rid their minds of
undue biases, but this need not doom the hierarchical approach
in its applications and further extensions. There is a healthy
degree of care to have in ridding ourselves of bias, but I think
Sebo has offered us a stronger prescription for skepticism in
animal ethics than is merited.
It seems common in the secondary literature to view Kagan’s book as an impressive, clever contribution to animal ethics, but not ultimately successful in persuading the reader. I
myself find a hierarchical view to have some intuitive plausibility, and Kagan’s book to helpfully sketch what this implies for
animal ethics. Returning to the point of liberating potential, it
could even be a practical strength of accepting hierarchy that it
coheres with common sense, so that humans are more broadly
willing to endorse the view, and it can still address our heinous
treatment of nonhuman animals. It is likely the case that Kagan
even has this practical usefulness in mind when he says, “The
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moral theory with regard to animals that we need to be defending is indeed a hierarchical one; and until that fact is more
widely recognized in the philosophical literature, I suspect that
many of our efforts to secure decent and just treatment for animals will be doomed to failure.” (Kagan 2019, 303). The idea
is that, in addition to being the theoretically correct view, hierarchy, in according with common sense, is not the stumbling
block to animal liberation that unitarianism could be.
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